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CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: ANALYSIS OF 
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
 Testifying before Congress, United States (“U.S.”) Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy warned of the ills of solitary confinement and criticized the use of “isolation cells” 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2015).  Justice Kennedy also noted in a concurring opinion 
(Davis v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2209) that some inmates spend decades in solitary confinement in a 
“windowless cell no larger than a typical parking spot for 23 hours a day…and…when…[let out 
they are]…allowed little or no opportunity for conversation or interaction with anyone.”  In fact, 
since 1890, the Supreme Court has known of “the human toll wrought by extended terms of 
isolation.”  The Court warned that isolation cells cause “a further terror and a peculiar mark of 
infamy” (Davis v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2210, quoting In re Medley, 1890, p. 168), elaborating that a 
“considerable number of…prisoners fell, after even a short [solitary] confinement, into a semi-
fatuous condition…and others [become] violently insane; others, still, commit[ ] suicide” (Davis 
v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2210, quoting In re Medley, 1890, p. 170; Freckelton, 2011; Rivlin, et al., 
2013).   
Solitary confinement refers to the practice of correctional administrators of placing an 
inmate in restricted housing or in a long-term supermax security housing (McGinnis et al., 2014, 
2008b; Shames et al., 2015). Solitary confinement includes isolation through disciplinary or 
punitive segregation, administrative segregation, and protective custody (Frost & Monteiro, 
2016; Shames et al., 2015). Disciplinary or punitive segregation involves short term confinement 
in a restrictive housing unit to sanction inmates for specific infractions. It is imposed after a 
disciplinary hearing and requires due process safeguards (O'Keefe, 2008). Administrative 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
2 
 
 
segregation is used to separate inmates deemed a significant threat to institutional security. It 
refers to long-term classification to the supermax unit or facility within a correctional system 
(Frost & Monteiro, 2016). Protective custody refers to the practice of segregating inmates for 
their own protection because they are at high risk of victimization. Inmates placed in solitary 
confinement experience psychological trauma (Haney, 2003; Johnson, 2016; Shoats v. Horn, 
2000; Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2017), stupor, difficulties 
with thinking and concentration, obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty 
tolerating external stimuli (Grassian, 2006, p. 331), anxiety and panic (Haney & Lynch, 1997, p. 
500), depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, hallucinations, paranoia, 
claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation (Freckelton, 2011; Haney & Lynch, 1997; Kupers, 
2017), physical harm, such as high rates of suicide (Hayes, 2017; Rivlin, et al., 2013) and self-
mutilation (Grassian, 1983), weight loss, hypertension, heart abnormalities, and aggravation of 
pre-existing medical problems (Korn, 1988; Reiter, 2016). Despite the well-researched trauma 
wrought by even short periods of segregation (Haney, 2018; Smith, 2006), the U.S. correctional 
system implements this practice as a primary means of disciplining inmates or maintaining 
institutional peace and order (Lee & Prabhu, 2015; Obama, 2016; U.S. Department of Justice, 
2016), which runs contrary to the position taken by the National Commission on Correctional 
Health Care (2016).  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics, for instance, reports that among a sample of 91,177 adult 
inmates in 233 state and federal prisons and 357 local jails in 2011-2012, 4.4% of state and 
federal inmates and 2.7% of jail inmates were confined in administrative segregation (Beck, 
2015). Almost 20% of prison inmates and 18% of jail inmates were placed in restrictive housing 
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(e.g., disciplinary or administrative segregation or solitary confinement) in the prior 12 months 
or since coming to their current facility, while 29% of prison inmates and 22% of jail inmates 
with symptoms of serious psychological distress were placed in restrictive housing in the prior 
12 months (Beck, 2015). The substantial portion of inmates placed in segregation increased 
inmate litigation questioning its legality under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the U.S. Constitution (Allen-Bell, 2012; Henderson, 2015).   
The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence on legal standards affecting an inmate’s 
liberty interest to be free from segregation can be traced back to Hewitt v. Helms (1983). Prior to 
Sandin v. Conner (1995), the analysis focused on whether prison regulations contained 
“mandatory” language protecting a liberty interest instead of the confinement conditions 
experienced by the inmate (Beverati v. Smith, 1997, p. 503; Marcus, 2015, p. 1169). After 
Sandin, the analysis revolved around whether the segregation conditions imposed “atypical and 
significant hardship” on the inmate beyond the routine prison experience (Benjamin v. Fraser, 
2001; Marcus, 2015). In Sandin (1995, pp. 485-487), the Court held that an inmate’s 30-days 
disciplinary segregation did not implicate a liberty interest because it did not “drastically 
deviate” from the basic conditions of his sentence, involve a “major disruption” of his 
environment,” or “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”  Plaintiff’s 30-day disciplinary 
segregation was not excessive compared to “similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in 
either duration or degree of restriction” (Sandin v. Conner, 1995, pp. 486-487).   
Similar to Sandin, the Court in Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) considered the nature of the 
more-restrictive confinement and its duration. In Wilkinson (2005, p. 213), however, the Court 
explained that an inmate’s assignment to a maximum-security prison with “highly restrictive 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
4 
 
 
conditions” imposed “atypical and significant hardship” because of “significant differences” 
between conditions at the maximum-security prison and “most solitary confinement facilities.”  
The Court noted that the inmate’s placement in the maximum security prison was indefinite and, 
after an initial 30-day review, was only reviewed annually. In addition, placement in the 
maximum security prison disqualified the inmate from parole consideration (Wilkinson v. Austin, 
2005).  
 Despite these pronouncements by the Supreme Court, lower courts have vacillated in 
construing what constitutes atypical and significant hardship (Johnson, 2016; Marcus, 2015).  
The Court did not define any baseline in Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) from which to compare 
whether the questioned segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate. 
Federal courts have consequently developed varying interpretations and outcomes when faced 
with inmate litigation challenging conditions of their segregation. 
Objectives 
 This article examines precedent in the various 12 U.S. Courts of Appeals (the 11 
numbered circuits and the D.C. Circuit) to determine differences and similarities among federal 
circuit case law when interpreting various aspects of inmate segregation, namely: liberty 
interests, atypical and significant hardships, and baselines of comparison. The article concludes 
that despite the voluminous research pointing out the deleterious effects of solitary confinement 
on inmates’ mental and physical health, these effects play a relatively minor role in the judicial 
assessment of the constitutionality of administrative segregation and punitive isolation. 
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METHOD 
The WESTLAW database contains electronic copies of all published and unpublished 
court decisions.  A keyword search was used to gather cases on inmate segregation decided by 
all 12 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals.  The advanced search parameters required that the terms 
“Wilkinson v. Austin” AND “atypical and significant hardship” appeared in the “main body” of 
the case and that both reported and unreported cases filed and decided after January 1, 2005 be 
searched for relevant cases (N=110).  The authors focused on cases citing Wilkinson v. Austin 
(2005) which involved extreme conditions of administrative segregation in a supermax facility in 
contrast to the more routine conditions of disciplinary segregation in Sandin v. Conner (1995). 
The intent was to examine inmate litigation alleging that their conditions were sufficiently 
extreme so as to trigger the standard of atypical and significant hardship. The analysis did not 
include solitary confinement cases where inmates did not challenge the legality of their 
confinement, such as death row inmates alleging the unconstitutionality of the death penalty or 
segregated inmates alleging excessive use of force. Since the analysis specifically focused on 
inmate litigation attacking the legality of their solitary confinement conditions, the search terms 
were limited to the Supreme Court’s legal standard of atypical and significant hardship. 
The article analyzes a population of cases and not a sample.  The authors then read each 
case individually and determined that not all cases were relevant to the article, either because the 
case did not involve inmate segregation, only discussed atypical and significant hardship briefly, 
made reference to Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) in passing, did not contain sufficient facts to enable 
full analysis, or contained a decision that either affirmed or repealed a lower court’s decision, 
without discussing the facts.  Also, some of the cases were repeated because of the appeal 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
6 
 
 
process through the federal courts.  The deletion process also excluded all criminal cases, 
yielding a total of 68 circuit court cases.  The authors conducted an inductive doctrinal analysis 
(Nolasco, Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010) to synthesize circuit court decisions on legal concepts 
surrounding inmate segregation, creating a framework from which to present the analysis 
(Nolasco, et al., 2015).  
ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT 
Identification of Liberty Interests within Segregation 
A long line of precedent emphasize that incarcerated persons retain only a “narrow range 
of protected liberty interests” due to the “necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges 
and rights” (Abbott v. McCotter, 1994, p. 1442; Hewitt v. Helms, 1983, p. 467; In re Long Term 
Admin. Segregation, 1999, p. 468; Price v. Johnston, 1948, p. 285; Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 
1011). To prevail on a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) he or she 
was deprived of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws; and, (2) the deprivation 
occurred “under color of state law” (Bingham v. Thomas, 2011, p. 1175). A §1983 action based 
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause must allege a deprivation of a protected 
liberty interest (Bass v. Perrin, 1999; Smith v. Deemer, 2016).  Liberty interests are violated, for 
instance, when state action alters the term of an inmate’s imprisonment  (e.g., revocation of good 
time credit) or imposes an atypical and significant hardship beyond the ordinary conditions of 
prison life (Burnette v. Fahey, 2012; Greenholtz v. Inmates, 1979; Hewitt v. Helms, 1983; 
Lovelace v. Lee, 2006; Sandin v. Conner, 1995; Smith v. Deemer, 2016; Vitek v. Jones, 1980; 
Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014; Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005; Wolff v. McDonnell, 1974).  The 
requirement of procedural due process must be based on the express provisions of a state statute, 
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regulation, or policy granting the inmate a protected liberty interest (Meachum v. Fano, 1976; 
Prieto v. Clarke, 2015).  
Appendix 1 describes how the different U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals after Wilkinson v. 
Austin (2005) interpret three issues surrounding inmate segregation, focusing on the 
identification of liberty interests, atypical and significant hardships, and baselines of comparison.  
An inmate does not have any liberty interest in avoiding: (1) change in status or classification 
“because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison” (Keck v. Zenon, 2007, p. 
818; Meachum v. Fano, 1976, p. 225; Templeman v. Gunter, 1994, p. 369); (2) disciplinary 
segregation imposed as a sanction after a due process hearing (Hallman v. Cate, 2012; Keck v. 
Zenon, 2007; Rodriguez v. Pearson, 2012) or pending investigation for another inmate’s death 
(Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005), unless it “inevitably” lengthens a prisoner’s sentence (Carson v. 
Johnson, 1997, p. 821); and, (3) administrative segregation based on a legitimate penological 
interest (McKeithan v. Beard, 2009; Orellana v. Kyle, 1995). 
The First Circuit considered the duration and exigency of the punitive segregation when 
it upheld the 40-day segregation of an inmate without a hearing “for his own sake and for the 
protection of others—while investigating the circumstances” (Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005, p. 
486; Cf. Reardon v. United States, 1991, p. 1522). The Second Circuit considers both the 
duration and conditions of an inmate’s segregation (Palmer v. Richards, 2004; Tellier v. Fields, 
2000). The Second Circuit found that an inmate had a liberty interest in avoiding administrative 
segregations lasting 180 (Kalwasinski v. Morse, 1999) and 305 days (Colon v. Howard, 2000). 
Confinements “of an intermediate duration—between 101 and 305 days” require detailed 
scrutiny of whether the inmate experienced atypical and significant hardship, but segregations 
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longer than 305 days definitely  trigger a liberty interest, which require due process protections 
(Colon v. Howard, 2000, p. 232).  
The Third Circuit also considers both the length of segregation and conditions of 
confinement to determine whether the inmate was deprived of his liberty interests (Burns v. Pa. 
Dep’t. of Corr., 2001). In Diaz v. Canino (2012), inmate Diaz was placed in disciplinary 
segregation because prison officials received information that he was planning to escape. After a 
misconduct hearing, he was found guilty and sentenced to 360-days in disciplinary confinement.  
While in disciplinary confinement, Diaz was subjected to “continuous searches,” “regular 
relocation of his cell,” and “was unable to sleep” because his cell lights “remained turned on” (p. 
216). The Third Circuit held that: (1) the conditions and the length of Diaz’s segregation did not 
impose atypical and significant hardship; and, (2) Diaz did not provide any baseline of 
comparison since he did not specify the conditions experienced by other inmates who were not in 
disciplinary segregation. 
Fourth Circuit precedent hold that a death row inmate does not have any protected liberty 
interest in avoiding isolation on death row (Prieto v. Clarke, 2015). Prieto involved an inmate 
who was confined to death row pursuant to Virginia state policy. Under the policy, death row 
inmates cannot be placed in any alternative confinement, live in isolated cells, and have more 
onerous and restrictive visitation and recreation privileges compared to general population 
inmates. 
The Fifth Circuit denied the existence of a protected liberty interest in the following 
cases: (1) 14-days of disciplinary segregation of a federal inmate, resulting in a three-month loss 
of commissary, visitation, and telephone privileges (Watkins v. Lnu, 2013); (2) administrative 
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segregation without “extraordinary circumstances” (Cruz v. Forrest, 2009, p. 901; Hernandez v. 
Velasquez, 2008, pp. 562-564; Huff v. Thaler, 2013, p. 311; Jimenez v. McQueen, 2012; Luken v. 
Scott, 1995, p. 193; Pichardo v. Kinker, 1996, pp. 612-613; Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014, p. 
853); and, (3) an inmate’s custodial classification (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008; Moody v. 
Baker, 1988; Rollins v. Cain, 2011), unless the inmate experienced atypical and significant 
hardship (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016).  The Fifth Circuit cautioned that prison officials should be 
granted “the widest possible deference” in classifying prisoners’ custodial status when necessary 
“to maintain security and preserve internal order” (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008, p. 562; 
McCord v. Maggio, 1991; Pichardo v. Kinker, 1996, pp. 612-613). Thus, inmates have few 
liberty interests when balanced against the prison officials’ custodial and security interests. 
In Hernandez v. Velasquez (2008), an inmate serving a life sentence for capital murder 
was placed on lockdown status after he was suspected of being a gang member and was planning 
a riot with a rival prison gang. While on lockdown for approximately one year, he was confined 
to a two-person cell measuring five-feet by nine-feet and was allowed to leave his cell only for 
showers, medical appointments, and family visits. The Fifth Circuit held that an inmate 
maintains a due process challenge to his custodial classification only when he or she 
“demonstrates extraordinary circumstances” (p. 562).  The lockdown conditions in Hernandez, 
however, did not impose an atypical or significant hardship because they were “comparable to, if 
not less severe than, those found unactionable in other cases” (p. 563).  Temporary lockdown to 
prevent gang violence was a normal condition of confinement that an inmate could expect while 
in prison (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997).  
According to the Sixth Circuit, an inmate does not possess any liberty interest in avoiding 
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61-days of administrative segregation (Jones v. Baker, 1998; Joseph v. Curtin, 2010; Rimmer-
Bey v. Brown, 1995), transfer to a higher security level facility (Joseph v. Curtin, 2010), or 
transfer from one state correctional institution to another that is not a supermax facility (Bell v. 
Wilkinson, 2005) unless the conditions imposed atypical and significant hardship. An initial 
placement in administrative segregation or an increase in security classification does not 
constitute an atypical and significant hardship because a prisoner “has no constitutional right to 
remain incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification” 
(Harbin–Bey v. Rutter, 2005, p. 577; Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 2008, pp. 794-795).  
Under Seventh Circuit precedent, substantial lengths or unusually harsh conditions in 
segregation may trigger a liberty interest (Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 2009; Means v. 
Larson, 2014; Townsend v. Cooper, 2014). Short periods of segregation for 10-days (Smith v. 
Birkey, 2011), one-month (Means v. Larson, 2014), or 78-days (Obriecht v. Raemisch, 2014), 
transfers to discretionary nonpunitive administrative segregation pending investigation 
(Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008), or transfers to less restrictive segregation (Furrow v. Marberry, 
2011; Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 2006) do not implicate a liberty interest (Toston v. Thurmer, 
2012; Earl v. Racine Cnty. Jail, 2013; Lekas v. Briley, 2005; Orr v. Larkins, 2010; Richardson v. 
Runnels, 2010).  
According to the Eighth Circuit, an inmate does not enjoy any “constitutional right to 
remain in a particular institution” (Goff v. Burton, 1993, p. 737; Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 
2004, p. 503). Prison administrators may transfer a prisoner “for whatever reason or for no 
reason at all” (Olim v. Wakinekona, 1983, p. 250). In Saylor v. Nebraska (2016), for example, an 
inmate who was sexually assaulted by other inmates was transferred to protective custody status 
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at another correctional facility that could provide him proper medical treatment and counseling.  
The Eighth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not protect an 
inmate against transfer from one institution to a “comparable prison” for the “sole purpose” of 
“continuing his psychiatric care” (Saylor v. Nebraska, 2016, p. 647).  
In Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections (2007), the Tenth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff did not have a liberty interest in avoiding protective custody. Here, a 
routine physical examination of an inmate transferred to the women’s state prison revealed that 
she was anatomically male. Although prison officials determined that she was a low security risk 
during initial placement, they recommended segregation for safety reasons, her “physical 
condition” as a hermaphrodite, and the “need to tailor programs” for her (p. 1337). After initial 
placement, her status was reviewed every 90-days and she was furnished written copies of the 
decision after each periodic review. While in protective confinement, the plaintiff had access to 
almost all amenities provided to general population inmates, such as psychiatric and counseling 
sessions, adequate clothing, the same food as general population inmates, access to prison staff 
and medical care, regular reading materials, and various other personal hygiene items. The Tenth 
Circuit explained that plaintiff was placed in segregation for safety reasons because other 
inmates in general population who were sexual assault victims may be fearful of her or may 
threaten her for other reasons. Conditions of her confinement were not extreme and, although 
“Spartan,” were not atypical of protective custody (p. 1343). The court concluded that 
administrative segregation did not extend the duration of her sentence—she was released after 
serving 14 months.  
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Determining “Atypical and Significant Hardship” 
Since courts consider the severity and duration of the restrictive conditions to determine 
atypical and significant hardship (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013; Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 2008; 
Palmer v. Richards, 2004; Serrano v. Francis, 2003; Shoats v. Horn, 2000; Wilkerson v. 
Goodwin, 2014), inmates successfully claim a protected liberty interest if they present evidence 
on the confinement conditions in administrative segregation (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016; Evans v. 
Vinson, 2011). Some circuit courts aggregate the time spent at different facilities to determine 
whether its duration imposed atypical and significant hardship. In Giano v. Selsky (2001, p. 226), 
the Second Circuit aggregated the inmate’s administrative segregation at two different facilities 
because “the two periods of confinement were based on the same administrative rationale” and 
conditions of confinement were “identical at both facilities.” The Third Circuit aggregated the 
plaintiff’s cumulative eight-year period of administrative custody in multiple state and federal 
institutions (Shoats v. Horn, 2000), while the Fifth Circuit aggregated time spent in different 
facilities under the same prison system to determine the total duration of segregation (Wilkerson 
v. Goodwin, 2014). The Fifth Circuit suggested that “two-and-a-half years” (30 months) of 
administrative segregation is a “threshold of sorts for atypicality,” so that “18-19 months of 
segregation under even the most isolated of conditions” may not implicate a liberty interest while 
a 40-year lockdown of inmate is unconstitutional (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016, p. 476; Wilkerson v. 
Goodwin, 2014, p. 855). The Sixth Circuit held that the duration of administrative segregation 
imposed atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in the following cases: (1) 8-years of 
administrative segregation (Harris v. Caruso, 2012); (2) indefinite placement in administrative 
segregation (Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 2008; Hatch v. District of Columbia, 1999; Iqbal v. Hasty, 
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2007; Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t. of Corr., 1999; Serrano v. Francis, 2003; Shoats v. Horn, 2000; 
Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005; Stephens v. Cottey, 2005); and (3) inmate’s segregation continued 
indefinitely and affected his eligibility for parole (Heard v. Caruso, 2009).  
The Seventh Circuit examines the “combined import” of the duration and conditions of 
segregation (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 743; Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 2009, p. 
697). Relatively short periods of segregation such as 59-days (Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008) or six-
months (Whitford v. Boglino, 1995) without “exceptionally harsh conditions” do not give rise to 
a liberty interest, unless segregation “significantly altered” the conditions of the inmate’s 
sentence (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 744; Whitford v. Boglino, 1995, p. 533). Inmates, 
however, have a liberty interest in avoiding lengthy or extreme terms of segregation (Bryan v. 
Duckworth, 1996; Holly v. Woolfolk, 2005; Hoskins v. Lenear, 2005; Marion v. Columbia Corr. 
Inst., 2009; Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008; Whitford v. Boglino, 1995). If the conditions of 
segregation were “significantly harsher” than those in the normal prison environment, then long-
term confinement, such as “a year of segregation” may implicate liberty interests, “where a few 
days or weeks might not” (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 743; Marion v. Columbia Corr. 
Inst., 2009, pp. 697-698). Under Seventh Circuit precedent, “even extremely harsh” prison 
conditions by themselves may “not be so atypical” as to create a protected liberty interest  
(Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008, p. 769). Discretionary segregation imposed for “administrative, 
protective, or investigative purposes” is an “ordinary incident of prison life” that inmates “should 
expect to experience” while incarcerated (Lekas v. Briley, 2005, p. 611; Meriwether v. Faulkner, 
1987, p. 414; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997, pp. 1175-1176). 
 The Ninth Circuit adopts a context-dependent, “fact-by-fact consideration” (Ramirez v. 
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Galaza, 2003, p. 861) that focuses on the conditions of confinement (Chappell v. Mandeville, 
2013; Duffy v. Riveland, 1996; McQuillion v. Duncan, 2002; Mitchell v. Dupnik, 1996; Mujahid 
v. Meyer, 1995; Myron v. Terhune, 2007). The court considers three factors: (1) whether the 
conditions “mirrored” those in “analogous discretionary confinement settings” (e.g., 
administrative segregation and protective custody); (2) the “duration and intensity” of the 
conditions; and (3) whether the change in confinement would “inevitably affect” the duration of 
the inmate’s sentence (Chappell v. Mandeville, 2013, pp. 1064-1065; Ramirez v. Galaza, 2003, 
p. 861).  
The Tenth Circuit examines “several nondispositive factors” to determine whether 
segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship on the routine aspects of prison life: (1) the 
segregation “relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest;” (2) the confinement 
conditions are “extreme” (Fogle v. Pierson, 2006, p. 1265); (3) the segregation “increases the 
duration of confinement;” and (4) the segregation is “indeterminate” (Abbott v. McCotter, 1994, 
p. 1442; Deberry v. Davis, 2012, p. 801; Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of 
Corrections, 2007, p.1342; McAdams v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2014, p. 721; 
Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, pp. 1011-1012; Stallings v. Werholtz, 2012, p. 844; Suarez v. Palomino, 
2014, p. 735).  
The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of administrative segregation in the 
following cases:  (1) confinement of a former defense contractors under special administrative 
measures at the federal prison’s Administrative Maximum Facility (“ADX”) in Florence, 
Colorado after conviction for federal conspiracy to export classified defense information and 
divulging national security secrets (Gowadia v. Stearns, 2014); (2) long-term segregation for 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
15 
 
 
potentially violent inmates, including plaintiff’s more than 400-days segregation in maximum 
security due to “verbal and written threats to kill prison employees who laid hands on him” 
(Marshall v. Ormand, 2014, pp. 661-662); (3) long-term administrative segregation of an inmate 
pending an assault investigation for safety reasons and because of prior disciplinary history of 
serious infractions, including gang membership and assault of other inmates (Jordan v. FBOP, 
2006; McAdams v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2014); and, (4) transfer of inmates 
convicted of terrorism-related offenses to ADX in Florence, CO (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012) due to 
national security concerns after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (U.S. v. Rahman, 1999; 
U.S. v. Rezaq, 1998).  
The Tenth Circuit observed that ADX conditions: (1) are not “extreme” although more 
restrictive than other segregation units —plaintiffs had “control over the lights in their cells,” 
access to outdoor recreation, maintained contact and communication with staff and other 
inmates, and were allowed five “no contact social visits” and “two 15-minute phone calls per 
month” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1014); (2) are “substantially similar to” conditions “routinely 
imposed” in “any solitary confinement setting” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1015); and (3) did not 
increase the duration of their sentences and was not indeterminate because of the availability of 
periodic reviews (Shoats v. Horn, 2000, p. 144; Trujillo v. Williams, 2006, p. 1225).  
  The Eleventh Circuit held that an inmate does not have any liberty interest in avoiding 
15-days of disciplinary segregation that does not result in loss of any good-time credit and where 
conditions of confinement (e.g., lack of writing surface, lock for storage bin, and a television) do 
not represent such “dramatic departure” from ordinary prison life (Smith v. Deemer, 2016, p. 
868).  Atypical and significant hardship must exist for a “significant period of time” and must be 
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“severe relative to regular prison” (Smith v. Deemer, 2016, p. 868).  Administrative confinement 
for 30-days (Sandin v. Conner, 1995) or 60-days (Rodgers v. Singletary, 1998) does not impose 
atypical and significant hardship, but segregation for 500-days (Magluta v. Samples, 2004) or 
one-year (Williams v. Fountain, 1996) constitutes atypical and significant hardship. 
Assessing Baselines of Comparison 
The Supreme Court declined to define the baseline from which to compare what is 
“atypical and significant hardship” (Sandin v. Conner, 1995; Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005). 
Appendix 1 describes the different baselines of comparison used by the different U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals including: (1) general population conditions at the same institution (Beverati 
v. Smith, 1997; Hill v. Fleming, 2006; Keenan v. Hall, 1996; Penrod v. Zavaras,1996; Williams 
v. Lindamood, 2013, p. 561); (2) other types of administrative segregation, including protective 
custody, in the particular state’s penal system (Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002; Griffin v. Vaughn, 
1997; Jones v. Baker, 1998; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997, pp. 1175-1176); (3) conditions experienced 
by “other inmates in the same segregation” unit (Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002, pp. 1225-1226; Hill 
v. Fleming, 2006, p. 666);  (4) experiences of other “uniquely placed or difficult to place 
prisoners” (e.g., physically or mentally ill or dependent inmates, elderly inmates, or inmates with 
disabilities) (Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2007, pp. 1341-1342); 
and, (5) “the most restrictive confinement conditions routinely imposed on inmates serving 
similar sentences” (Hatch v. District of Columbia, 1999, pp. 847, 856); or, at the “harshest 
facility in the state’s most restrictive prison” (Aref v. Lynch, 2016, p. 254; Wagner v. Hanks, 
1997, p. 1175).  
The Second Circuit conducts “a fact-specific determination,” comparing the duration and 
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conditions of plaintiff’s segregation with those in similar administrative confinement and the 
general population (Aref v. Lynch, 2016, p. 254; Arce v. Walker, 1998, p. 336; Brooks v. DiFasi, 
1997, pp. 48-49). The Third and Tenth Circuits generally use other forms of administrative 
segregation in the same prison as the baseline of comparison (Allah v. Bartkowski, 2014; 
Fantone v. Latini, 2015; Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002; Griffin v. Vaughn, 1997; Jones v. Baker, 
1998). Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits require the plaintiff to present evidence on the 
“precise conditions of ordinary prison life prior to placement” (Williams v. Lindamood, 2013, p. 
561) and that the segregation involved a “major disruption to his environment” compared to 
“placement in the general population” (Smith v. Regional Director of Florida, 2010, p. 13). The 
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that its “own opinions” have “inconsistently used comparisons 
either with inmates in the same segregation or those in the general prison population” (Ajaj v. 
U.S., 2008,  p. 585; Jordan v. FBOP, 2006, p. 650). 
In Allah v. Bartkowski (2014, p. 137), Allah was transferred to Management Control Unit 
Detention (“MCU”), a “close-custody” solitary confinement unit where he was: (1) isolated in a 
small cell in a block that contained mentally ill inmates; (2) restricted to 10-minute showers daily 
and a 90-minute yard period every second or third day; and, (3) not permitted access to toilets 
during the 90-minute yard period, causing him to sometimes relieve himself while in the yard. 
The Third Circuit concluded that the duration and conditions of Allah’s confinement implicate a 
liberty interest because plaintiff was confined in the MCU for six-years and conditions in the 
MCU were significantly more restrictive than conditions in administrative segregation in the 
same prison (Allah v. Bartkowski, 2014; Jago v. Van Curen, 1981; Shoats v. Horn, 2000).  
In a later case involving inmates who were kept on death row for several years after their 
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death sentences were vacated, the Third Circuit used the general population conditions as a 
baseline for comparison (Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2017). 
Here, two inmates remained several years on death row after their death sentences were vacated. 
One inmate spent approximately 20-years on death row, eight of which were spent after he was 
granted a resentencing hearing. Another inmate spent 22-years on death row, six of which were 
spent after he was granted a resentencing hearing. While on death row, plaintiffs were confined 
in a windowless seven by 12-feet cell for almost 24-hours daily, deprived of communication with 
the general population, and allowed four non-legal visits per month, during which they were 
locked in a “closet-sized room” behind a “reinforced sheet of glass” and not permitted physical 
contact with visitors (p. 554). The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs demonstrated atypical and 
significant hardship. Their continued placements on death row were indefinite, lasting for years 
without any specific date for their transfer to general population. The court observed that other 
forms of segregation, such as punitive segregation are often “predetermined and fixed,” unless 
the inmate’s behavior requires additional periods of segregation (p. 562). The court also noted 
that conditions on death row different “significantly” from “routine prison conditions” in the 
state’s correctional institutions (p. 563). Inmates in general population have access to: open air 
activities without strip searches, windows, natural light, daily showers, more frequent visits 
where contact is allowed, group religious services, jobs and vocational programs (e.g., clothing 
factory jobs, culinary training, and barbershop training), group sport activities, and unlimited 
phone calls as long as they could afford them.  
The Fourth Circuit reiterated that there is no single standard for determining the baseline 
of comparison (Beverati v. Smith, 1997; Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015; Prieto v. Clarke, 2015; 
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Ramirez v. Galaza, 2003). The atypicality baseline should be determined “in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life” since confinement conditions will vary “depending on a 
particular inmate’s conviction”  (Lovelace v. Lee, 2006, p. 202). A fact specific “case-by-case” 
approach should consider conditions routinely imposed on “inmates serving comparable 
sentences” (Prieto v. Clarke, 2015, p. 254;  Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1012). The Fourth Circuit 
used the general population as a baseline for atypicality in Beverati v. Smith (1997) because state 
prison regulations granted inmates in administrative segregation almost the same privileges of 
general population inmates, including at least “one-hour of recreation outside their cells seven-
days per week” and “substantially the same access to prison services and educational 
programming” (pp. 503-504). In the subsequent case of Prieto v. Clarke (2015, p. 253), however, 
the Fourth Circuit cautioned that the “baseline for atypicality” is not always the general prison 
population but may vary depending on the “prisoner’s conviction and sentence.” The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed that the general population is the baseline for atypicality for inmates sentenced 
to confinement in the general prison population but later transferred to security detention 
(Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015, p. 527).   
In Incumaa v. Stirling (2015), an inmate who was a member of the Islamic extremist 
group Nation of Gods and Earths (the “Five Percenters”) participated in a 1995 riot with other 
Five Percenters in a prison operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the 
“Department”). Following this riot, the Five Percenters were designated as a Security Threat 
Group. Plaintiff was then transferred from general population to the Maximum Security Unit, the 
most restrictive security detention in prison. He was later transferred to the Special Management 
Unit (“SMU”), a less restrictive detention. The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiff’s 20-year period 
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of segregation imposed atypical and significant hardship, using the general population as a 
baseline for comparison (Burnette v. Fahey, 2012; Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015). The Fourth Circuit 
found that plaintiff’s confinement conditions were severely restrictive compared to general 
population conditions. He was subjected to daily cavity and strip searches, confined to a small 
cell, with only 10-hours of activity outside the cell per month, prohibited from socializing with 
other inmates, and denied educational, vocational, and therapy programs. Also, his confinement 
to the SMU is “extraordinary in its duration and indefiniteness” (Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015, p. 
531).  
In Wilkerson v. Goodwin (2014, p. 855), the Fifth Circuit considered the duration of 
solitary confinement, the severity of the restrictions, and its “effectively indefinite nature,” 
concluding that plaintiff inmate’s segregation imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” 
under “any possible baseline.” The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the inmate’s 39-year 
segregation was “almost five times the duration deemed sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest 
in Shoats v. Horn (2000). The Fifth Circuit clarified that short periods in segregation that do not 
give rise to a liberty interest range from 12-months (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008), 15-months 
(Griffin v. Vaughn, 1997), and two-and-one-half years (Jones v. Baker, 1998).  
The Fifth Circuit compared conditions of plaintiff’s 39-years of administrative 
segregation to conditions of general population inmates, conditions in segregated confinement 
within the Louisiana system as a whole, and conditions of other inmates serving life sentences 
(Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014). The court noted that plaintif was: (1) confined alone to his cell 
for 23-hours per day with one-hour allotted for exercise and shower; (2) denied religious or 
educational opportunities, and (3) denied other privileges available to inmates in the general 
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population. His segregation was also indefinite and static because the reviewing board routinely 
repeated the initial reason for placement in lockdown as the same reason for continued 
confinement. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s approximately 40-year segregation 
is “so atypical” that no other inmate in Louisiana has been confined for the same period (p. 856).  
The Ninth Circuit declined to identify an appropriate baseline of comparison in Brown v. 
Oregon Dept. of Corrections (2014, p. 984) because “under any plausible baseline,” plaintiff’s 
27-month administrative segregation in the Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”) without 
meaningful review imposed on him atypical and significant hardship. The Brown case involved a 
state inmate who was assigned to the IMU for 27-months after being found in possession of a 
weapon. IMU inmates are confined in single-man cells for more than 23-hours per day, spend 
only 40-minutes daily outside their cells, allowed two non-contact visits per month and a 
maximum of two visitors in a six-month period, and denied access to privileges granted to 
general population inmates (e.g., prison and law libraries, group religious services, educational 
and vocational opportunities, telephone use except in emergencies, televisions, and personal 
property). The Ninth Circuit observed that the plaintiff was isolated almost 23-hours each day 
and denied most privileges granted to general population inmates. His IMU confinement was 
fixed and irreducible, lasting for 27-months compared to the limited period of confinement and 
periodic reviews given to inmates in other segregated-housing units. The Ninth Circuit observed 
that the inmate did not receive any meaningful review during his 27-month segregation in IMU. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants based 
on qualified immunity because prior to this case, the court had not resolved the issue of “whether 
the absence of post-placement periodic, meaningful review” implicates a protected liberty 
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interest (Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 2014, p. 988; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1982, p. 
818; Hope v. Pelzer, 2002, p. 741; Pearson v. Callahan, 2009, p. 244; Porter v. Bowen, 2007, 
pp. 1026-1027; Schwenk v. Hartford, 2000, pp. 1195-1196; U.S. v. King, 2012, p. 1189). It 
would grant such a liberty interest, moving forward in future cases. 
The Tenth Circuit declined to make a “rigid either/or assessment” of any baseline, instead 
opting to “outline four potentially relevant, nondispositive factors,” including whether: (1) the 
segregation relates to and furthers a “legitimate penological interest, such as safety or 
rehabilitation”; (2) the placement conditions are “extreme”; (3) the placement “increases the 
duration of confinement”; and, (4) the placement is “indeterminate” (Estate of DiMarco v. 
Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2007, p. 1342; Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1012). The proper 
baseline approach for the Tenth Circuit is a “fact-driven assessment” that considers the “totality 
of conditions presented by a given inmate’s sentence and confinement” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012).   
The Tenth Circuit considered both the general prison population and inmates in the same 
segregation unit as the baseline for comparison in Jordan v. FBOP (2006). In Jordan, a state 
inmate who was transferred to administrative detention pending investigation of a fellow 
inmate’s murder received written notice explaining the reasons for his segregation. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff 
did not show that his administrative detention imposed “atypical and significant hardship” 
compared to “either the general population or those in the same administrative detention” (p. 
652). While in segregation, he also received the same privileges as inmates in general population 
(except for group recreation). He experienced restrictions and conditions comparable to those of 
the general inmate population, except for one less social call per month and seven-hours a week 
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less recreation time.  
The Eleventh Circuit arrived at a similar decision in Turner v. Warden (2016), where an 
inmate was placed in the special management unit (“SMU”) of the Georgia State Prison. The 
SMU houses high-risk inmates with a history of disciplinary problems; it consists of six wings 
identified according to inmate restrictions from highest restriction to lowest restriction. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have any protected liberty interest in avoiding 
segregation in SMU because SMU conditions were similar to those in the general population, 
other types of administrative segregation, and protective custody (Delgiudice, Jr. v.  Primus, 
2017). Plaintiff  received regular meals, five-hours of weekly outdoor recreation, and a shower 
period three-times weekly. Unless he was in the most restrictive wing, he was allowed to keep 
personal property, have a television in his cell, experience human contact, and receive visitors on 
weekends.  
The D.C. Circuit adopted a “multi-factor approach” for determining the appropriate 
baseline of comparison  in Hatch v. District of Columbia (1999, pp. 856-858). The court said that 
a liberty interest arises only when the deprivation imposes an atypical and significant hardship 
“in relation to the most restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials ... routinely 
impose on inmates serving similar sentences” (pp. 856). The court used administrative 
segregation, the “most routinely imposed” disciplinary measure of isolation, as a baseline of 
comparison (p. 856). It scrutinized both the nature and length of the deprivation to determine 
atypicality of hardship. The court in Hatch court remanded the case for the district court to 
determine whether conditions of the inmate’s 29-week segregation was comparable to normal 
conditions of administrative segregation and whether its duration was “atypical” compared to the 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
24 
 
 
“length of administrative segregation routinely imposed on similarly situated prisoners” (Aref v. 
Lynch, 2016, p. 254).  
 In Aref v. Lynch (2016, p. 257), the D.C. Circuit concluded that confinement in the 
FBPO Communication Management Units (“CMU”) involved “significantly less deprivation 
than administrative segregation.” This case involved several inmates who were convicted of 
terrorism-related activities and transferred to the two CMUs in Indiana and Illinois.  The CMUs 
were established in response to a perceived “deficiency” in the monitoring of inmate 
communications that “allowed several inmates with terrorism-related convictions to 
communicate with extremist groups outside the prisons” (p. 246). The D.C. Circuit compared the 
conditions of inmates in administrative segregation with the conditions of inmates confined in 
the CMUs. The court noted that inmates in administrative segregation remain in their cells for 
23-hours a day, cannot work or access educational opportunities, have limited possessions of 
materials, can exercise only one-hour daily for five-days a week, are allowed only one 15-minute 
phone call per month, and are permitted to have four-hours of non-contact visits per month. 
CMU inmates can access common spaces for 16-hours a day, have access to educational and 
professional opportunities, can possess property, have no exercise restrictions, can make two 15-
minute calls per week, and are allowed two four-hour non-contact visits per month. The court 
nonetheless acknowledged that CMU confinement is indefinite and atypical because “only a 
handful are placed under these restrictions” (p. 257). The court found a liberty interest in CMU 
designation because it “seems analogous to a classification,” is exercised “selectively,” and its 
duration “is indefinite and could be permanent” (p. 257). Although the deprivations are not 
extreme, they “necessarily increase in severity over time”—communication restrictions in 
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administrative segregation last only during the period of segregation while restrictions in CMU 
may last indefinitely (p. 257). Having found a protected liberty interest, the court remanded the 
case for the district court to determine what type of due process is required.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This article shows that the 12 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have varying interpretations 
of the legal standards for determining the constitutionality of inmate segregation. They diverge 
on whether duration, confinement conditions, or a combination of both implicate liberty interests 
requiring due process protections, which segregation conditions impose atypical and significant 
hardship, and the baselines of comparison from which to determine atypicality of hardship. The 
lack of uniformity across the Circuits mean that inmates in some areas of the country are subject 
to longer terms of segregation and harsher conditions of confinement when compared to inmates 
in other areas. Moreover, the case law reported in this article shows that even when inmates 
prevail in their litigation, entitling them to due process protections, they may already have served 
months, years, and, in some cases, decades in solitary isolation cells (Campbell, 2016).  
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s lack of guidance has helped to foster these divergent opinions 
in the lower courts, and in the absence of more definitive guidelines, lower courts will continue 
to differ in both their interpretations and outcomes of inmate segregation litigation. These 
conflicts among the Circuits invite the Supreme Court to further clarify what the Constitution 
requires of prison officials when segregating inmates. Analyzing these segregation cases also 
exposes a disconnect between the law and scholarly research—while the law permits segregation 
of inmates for months and years, there is an overwhelming scholarly consensus that long-term 
isolation irreparably harm inmates (Henderson, 2015), promotes post-traumatic stress disorder 
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(Hagan et al., 2017), increases suicidal ideation (Hayes, 2017), and makes mentally ill inmates 
much worse (Haney & Lynch, 1997). 
The Supreme Court created the legal construct of atypical and significant hardship to 
determine the legality of solitary confinement in the cases of Sandin v Conner (1995) and 
Wilkinson v. Austin (2005). Various federal courts are required to apply and interpret this legal 
construct when deciding inmate litigation challenging their conditions of segregation. As an 
abstract concept, it is susceptible to different interpretations and a federal court has the option to 
possibly assess various mental and physical symptoms when determining atypicality and 
significance of hardship. However, courts do not interpret the construct to include the negative 
consequences on the mental and physical health of inmates. Instead, courts examine the duration 
and severity of the segregation conditions compared to different baselines. A more scientifically 
grounded interpretation would require courts to include an assessment of the harmful effects of 
solitary confinement, an approach that is not foreclosed by the legal standard of atypical and 
significant hardship. 
 Why does the law give short shrift to the harmful effects of long-term 
isolation/administrative segregation on inmates?  Based on separation of powers, federalism, and 
remnants of the “hands-off” doctrine, the Supreme Court (Turner v. Safley, 1987, p. 89) and 
lower federal courts (Oliver v. Scott, 2002, p. 745) have given state prison officials much 
discretion in how they operate prison facilities.  Judicial deference to prison administrators leads 
the legal analysis of the constitutionality of segregation to focus on the technocratic vicissitudes 
of the law, not on the harmful physical and mental outcomes wrought onto inmates. When 
assessing the constitutionality of segregation, courts need to focus more on the length of 
CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
27 
 
 
detention, the type of conditions of confinement to which inmates are exposed, and the outcomes 
such segregation has on inmates’ mental and physical health. While inmates possess limited 
liberty interests when segregated, such due process protections offer few reprieves from the 
dreadful effects of solitary confinement and punitive administrative segregation exacted on 
inmates housed in the nations prisons.   
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